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IN THE SUPRF:MF, COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v- Case No. 18998 




THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT IMPROPERLY 
RESTRICT APPELLANTS' CROSS-F:XAMINATION OF 
CERTAIN WITNESSES AND THUS DENY THEM THEIR 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION. 
"The right to cross-examination is an invaluable 
right embodied in Article I, section 12 of the Utah 
Constitution and in the Sixth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution which assures the right to confrontation." State 
v. Maestas, Utah, 564 P.2d 1386, 1387 (1977). However, the 
extent of cross-examination rests largely in the discretion of 
the trial judge, who is allowed considerable latitude in 
imposing reasonable limits on cross-examination. State v. 
starks, Utah, 581 P.2d 1015, 1017 (1978); State v. Curtis, 
Utah, 542 P.2d 744, 746 (1975). And unless the trial judge 
clearly abused his discretion, his or her rulings will not be 
reversed. Ibid. 
Appellants argue that there were several instances 
during their trial when the judge improperly restricted 
-1-
cross-examination and thus denied them their constitutional 
right of confrontation. They first cite a portion of defense 
counsel's cross-examination of Wanda Lairby, Virginia ("Lisa") 
Lairby's natural mother, which they allege is an example of 
improper restriction of cross-examination as to bias, 
interest, and motive to fabricate. However, appellants fail 
to quote the entire exchange between the judge and their , 
counsel. The following appears in the trial 
immediately after the last statement quoted in Appellants' 
Supplemental Brief at page 3: 
MR. LIONEL FARR: Well, if there is a 
question of custody and if she's biased 
for these children to stay with her and 
not go with him, to indicate somewhat her 
attitude towards these children being with 
him or even the least irritation at all. 
I would like to know whether she's biased 
and check it out. 
THE COURT: Well, I suppose if you 
want to go into the subject of why the 
visitation was stopped, I suppose that 
would be appropriate, but I don't know 
that your approach at the moment is 
relative or relevant. 
(R. 141-142). 
The judge's comments indicate that he did not intend 
to prohibit cross-examination of the witness for possible 
bias. He was, however, legitimately concerned that the 
cross-examination be orderly and relevant. As is well settled 
law, the constitutionally protected right of cross-examination 
does not entitle a defendant "to embark on fishing 
expeditions." See State v. Clayton, Utah, 658 P.2d 621, n23 
(1983). A foundation must fir-st be established upon which to 
base the r-elevancy of questions dur-ing cr-oss-examination. 
Ibid. 
Appellants seem to be ar-guing that the judge 
completely for-eclosed the possibility of questioning Wanda 
Lairby about a pending custody hearing. Given his comments 
after he sustained the State's objection to counsel's 
question about that matter-, it appears the judge simply was 
seeking fur-ther- foundation to support the relevancy of the 
inquiry. His suggestion that counsel explore "why visitation 
was stopped" supports this conclusion. Mor-eover, even if it 
was err-or to sustain an objection to counsel's question, the 
issue of a pending custody hear-ing was fully explored in later-
cross-examination of Wanda Lair-by (see R. 403-406). Thus, any 
error was not pr-ejudicial. See State v. Curtis, 542 P.2d at 
746. 
Appellants' references to portions of defense 
counsel's attempted cr-oss-examination of Lisa Lairby, Dr. 
William Palmer-, and Violet Jones as examples of improper 
r-estriction of cr-oss-examination are similarly without merit. 
Certain questions put to those witnesses were not allowed on 
the ground that they went beyond the scope of direct or 
redirect examination. This is in accord with the 
long-standing general rule in Utah that the scope of 
cross-examination is limited to the subject matter of the 
direct examination. see state v. Bleazard, 103 Utah 113, 133 
P.2d 1000, 1002 (1943): Rule 43(b), Utah Rules of Civil 
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Procedure (which is applicable to criminal proceedings under 
Rule 8l(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure); Rule 611, Utah 
Rules of Evidence (1983). Significantly, appellants made no 
argument to the trial court that the questions were 
permissible as exceptions to this general rule--e.g., inquiry 
into matters affecting the credibility of the witness. see 
State v. Curtis, 542 P.2d at 746. 
Finally, the questioning of Richard Long about a 
visitation rights agreement and his living with another person 
was not permitted on the ground that it was not relevant or 
material (see R. 539). Appellants failed to show 
satisfactorily how those questions were relevant to either the 
witness's credibility or the issues of the case (R. 428-431). 
The relevancy of those questions was far from obvious. Thus, 
appellants, having not laid sufficient foundation for 
relevancy, were not improperly restricted in their 
cross-examination of Long. See State v. Clayton, 658 P.2d at 
623. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO SECURE THE 
ATTENDANCE OF AN OUT-OF-STATE WITNESS WAS 
NOT REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
Appellants claim the trial court erred in refusing 
to secure for them the attendance of an out-of-state witness, 
Tracy Long (who apparently was in Arizona), pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. S 77-21-3 (1982) (Arizona has also adopted the 
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Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from Without 
a State in Criminal Proceedings. see Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§ 13-40Cl 2 ( l'l56), as amended). 
As the State noted in it's initial brief, the duty 
to present a defense devolves upon the defendant, who is 
responsible for the production of witnesses in his behalf. 
See Respondent's Brief at page 15. Because raised for 
the first time on appeal will not be considered by this 
Court, appellants' failure to bring to the attention of the 
trial judge the procedures provided for in S 77-21-3, of which 
he apparently was unaware (see R. 236), should preclude 
consideration of the argument they now present on appeal. 
See State v. Steggell, Utah, 660 P.2d 252 (1983). Furthermore, 
appellants made no showing at trial, nor do they make any 
here, that Tracy Long was a material witness (a requirement of 
S 77-21-3). They simply state that her anticipated testimony 
would have been material and relevant (see R. 235; Appellants' 
Supplemental Brief at p. 11). Under these circumstances, 
appellants' suggestion that the trial court's failure to 
secure the attendance of Tracy Long pursuant to § 77-21-3 




THE TRIAL COIJRT DID NOT DFNY APPFLLANTS 
THEIR RIGHT TO PRESENT CHARACTFR EVIDENCE, 
NOR DID IT ERR IN REFUSING TO GIVF AN 
INSTRUCTION ON CHARACTER WITNFSS FVlDFNCE. 
Appellants refer to several pages of the trial 
transcript to support their claim that the trial court unduly 
restricted their presentation of character evidence. It is 
somewhat difficult to respond to this claim because appellants 
do not demonstrate with any specificity how the trial court 
may have erred in this regard. However, a review of those 
references to the transcript reveals that objections to 
defense counsel's attempts to elicit character testimony were 
sustained on the legitimate grounds that insufficient 
foundation had been laid to qualify the witness and that the 
questions were not relevant to the reputation of the accused. 
As noted in state v. Goodliffe, Utah, 578 P.2d 1288 (1978): 
[T]he accepted prooedure in eliciting 
testimony of one's reputation as it 
pertains to his character or a trait of 
his character that is in issue is to first 
qualify the witness by determining if he 
is acquainted with the reputation of the 
person in question, and if so, then to 
have him relate what that reputation is. 
However appropriate it may be to prove a 
character trait in issue by testimony in 
the form of an opinion, it is not 
appropriate to elicit from the witness his 
individual opinion as to what the person's 
reputation is in regard thereto. 
578 P.2d at 1291. See also State v. Lopez, Utah, 626 P.2d 483 
(1981). 
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In short, appellants' failure to lay proper 
foundation for chararter testimony and to ask questions that 
were relevant to appellants' character restricted the 
introduction of character evidence. The court did not 
impermissibly restrict appellants' right to present character 
evidence. Cf. State v. Ervin, 22 Utah 2d 216, 451 P.2d 372 
( 1969). 
Appellants' further argument concerning the failure 
to give an instruction on character witness evidence is, as 
noted in the State's initial brief (see Respondent's Brief at 
p. 19), without merit. The following additional comments are 
intended to supplement the arguments made in that initial 
brief. 
It is generally agreed that unless the defendant has 
presented competent character evidence sufficient to support a 
character evidence instruction, he or she is not entitled to 
such an instruction. See, e.g., Conner v. State, Ga., 303 
S.E.2d 266 (1983): State v. Williams, 299 N.C. 652, 263 S.E.2d 
774 (1980); cf. State v. Stone, Utah 629 P.2d 442, (19fll) 
(which held that a defendant is entitled to an instruction on 
his theory of the case if there is evidence to support the 
requested instruction). Because appellants did not satisfy 
this basic requirement, the trial court did not err in 
refusing to give a character evidence instruction. 
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However, even if this Court were to find that it was 
error not to give the requested instruction, appellants were 
not prejudiced since even without the error there was no 
"reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for the 
defendant[s] ." State v. Fontana, Utah, p. 2d , No. 177'lfi, 
slip op. at p. 9 (decided March 2, 1984), quoting State v. 
Hutchison, Utah, 655 P.2d 635, 637 (1982). See also State v. , 
Mccumber, Utah, 622 P.2d 353, 359 (1980). 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT'S RULINGS CONCERN ING THE 
ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT OPINION TESTIMONY 
WERE PROPER. 
A. DR. WILLIAM PALMER'S OPINION TESTIMONY 
WAS PROPERLY ALLOWED. 
or. William Palmer, a physician employed at Primary 
Children's Hospital and the University of Utah School of 
Medicine and who was also a member of the Child Protection 
Team of the University of Utah and Primary Children's Medical 
Center ( R. 320), testified that, in his op in ion, Lisa La irby 
had been sexually abused (R. 335). That opinion was based in 
large part on what Lisa Lairby told him during his examination 
of her, which included a physical examination of the vagina 
(R. 329, 334, 337). Appellants contend that Dr. Palmer should 
not have been allowed to give his opinion because insufficient 
foundation had been laid as to whether the statements Lisa 
Lairby made to him are typically relied upon by experts in 
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determining whether sexual ahllse has occurred. 
Information normally relied upon by a physician in 
the course of his professional duties may provide the basis 
for expert opinion testimony in the courtroom. In Edwards v, 
Diderickson, Utah, <;q7 P.2d 1328 (l97'l), this Court said: 
We recognize that expert evidence is 
sometimes justifiably based in part on 
evidence obtained outside the 
courtroom--even evidence of the 
adjudicatory facts in dispute. But such 
evidence is usually the type that an 
expert relies upon as a matter of course 
in forming opinions and is sufficiently 
reliable to warrant an opinion based 
thereon. see, Jenkins v. United 
States, 113 U.S. App. D.C. 300, 307 F.2d 
United States v. Aluminum Co. 
of American, 35 F.Supp. 820 (S.D.N.Y. 
194 0). 
597 P.2d at 1332 n.2. The following excerpt from Dr. Palmer's 
testimony indicates that statements from a child who is being 
examined for sexual abuse are normally relied upon by experts 
in the field in determining whether abuse has actually 
occurred: 
0. Did you say that your 
opinion, then, was influenced by what the 
child said to you? 
A. Yes, my opinion was 
influenced by what the child said to me, 
yes. 
o. was your opinion based 
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entirely upon what the child said to you? 
A. My opinion was based upon 
what the child said to me in terms of my 
experience with other children who are 
sexually abused. 
Q. okay. But was it based--I 
see. Then it was based also on what other 
children have said to you? 
A. It's based upon the fact 
that if I excluded physical evidence and 
only made an assessment as to sexual 
abuse having occurred in children who are 
not experienced sexually and since most 
sexual abuse does not involve penetration, 
then I would be excluding 80 percent of 
children who are sexually abused. 
o. so, what you are saying as 
far as this--
A. I'm saying my experience, my 
experience after seeing children who have 
been sexually abused is that children 
whose behavior, and that includes 
vocabulary and way of expressing things in 
terms of their genital area, when the 
behavior is beyond that which would be 
-10-
acceptable as normal, if you will, in a 
sexual sense in a given age group, then 
that has--yes, that has to influence a 
concern, It is one of the indicators of 
sexual abuse. 
(R. 338-339). See also testimony of Christine Swanson (R. 
303-311). 
The trial judge could justifiably have found that 
the interpretation of statements made by possible victims of 
child abuse to an examining physician, and the conclusions to 
be drawn therefrom, are "within the scope of the special 
knowledge, skill, experience or training possessed by the 
[physician] witness." Rule 56(2)(b), Utah Rules of Evidence 
(1971). The trial judge's ruling with respect to Dr. Palmer's 
testimony is in accord with the principle that the 
determination of the suitability of expert testimony in a case 
and the qualificiation of the proposed expert are within the 
sound discretion of the trial court. See State v. Clayton, 
Utah, 646 P.2d 723, 726 (1982). As noted in Clayton: 
In State v. Ward, 10 Utah 2d 34, 347 P.2d 
865 (1959), this Court held that where it 
appeared to the trial court that there was 
a reasonable foundation for the opinion of 
the expert witness, it was within the 
discretion of the court to admit the 
opinion and allow any frailties therein to 
be exposed on cross-examination. "The 
faults in it .•• go to its weight rather 
than to its competency." 10 Utah 2d at 
38, 347 P.2d at 868. 
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646 P.2d at 726. 
Finally, appellants characterize or. Palmer's 
testimony as opinion on whether Lisa Lairby was telling the 
truth. The record simply does not support that conclusion. 
Dr. Palmer's gave his opinion on whether the child had been 
sexually abused, nothing more, 
B. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY QUASHED 
APPELLANTS' SUBPOENA OF DR. 
LIEBRODER. 
Dr. Barbara Liebroder, who had conducted a 
psychological examination of Wanda Lairby but not of Lisa 
Lairby (see R. 574, 580), was subpoenaed to testify by 
appellants. After a lengthy discussion between the court and 
counsel about the content and purpose of the proposed 
testimony fran nr. Liebroder, the court granted the witness's 
motion to quash the subpoena (R. 571-583). It becomes obvious 
after reviewing that discussion that appellants' sole purpose 
for calling Dr. Liebroder was to elicit from her an opinion on 
Wanda Lairby's credibility. The court clearly quashed the 
subpoena on the grounds that it was improper to have a 
psychologist tell the jury whether a witness was telling the 
truth (R. 582-583). 
It is the exclusive function of the trier of fact to 
determine the credibility of the witnesses. State v. Howell, 
Utah, 649 P.2d 91, 97 (1982). Therefore, it was entirely 
proper for the trial court not to allow Dr. Liebroder to 
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testify. 
( 1980) : 
As noted in State v. Filson, Idaho, 613 P.2d 938 
A psychiatrist's testimony on the 
credibility of a witness may involve many 
dangers: the psychiatrist's testimony may 
not be relevant; the techniques used and 
theories advanced may not be generally 
accepted; the psychiatrist may not be in 
any better position to evaluate 
credibility than the juror; difficulties 
may arise in communication between 
psychiatrist and the jury; too much-
reliance may be placed upon the testimony 
of the psychiatrist; partisan 
psychiatrists may cloud rather than 
clarify issues; the testimony may be 
distracting, time-consuming and costly. 
613 P.2d at 942 n.3. Furthermore, appellants' reliance on 
State v. Miller, Utah, 677 P.2d 1129 (1984), as support for 
their claim that a psychologist should be al lowed to testify 
on a witness's credibility is misplaced. The Miller decision 
dealt with psychiatric testimony concerning the defendant's 
ability to form the intent required to commit the charged 
offense. It did not address the issue of psychiatric 
testimony on the credibility of a witness. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION IN DENYING APPELLANTS' MOTION 
FOR A PSYCHIATRIC EXAMINATION OF WANDA AND 
LISA LAIRBY. 
There are essentially three views on the matter of 
ordering a psychiatric examination of the complaining witness 
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in a sex crime case: (1) the court has no inherent power to 
compel a psychiatric examination; (2) the defendant has an 
absolute right to an order compelling a psychiatric 
examination of the complaining witness; and (3) the trial 
judge has the discretion to order a psychiatric examination 
when a compelling reason is shown. See State v. Gregg, 226 
Kan. 481, 602 P.2d 85, 89 (1979). The latter, and better, , 
view, which is fully discussed in Ballard v. Superior Court, 
64 Cal.2d 159, 49 Cal. Rptr. 302, 410 P.2d 838 (1966), has 
been adopted in the vast majority of jurisdictions. Gregg, 
602 P.2d at 89. Under that view, whether an examination is 
ordered "is within the sound discretion of the trial court" 
and a mot ion requesting the examination "should be granted 
only upon a substantial showing of need and justification, 
which is not a light burden." State v. Wounded Head, S.D., 
305 N.W.2d 677, 679 (1981). "The principle established by the 
majority of the cases is that the judge has the discretion to 
order such an examination, although the failure to do so has 
rarely been held an abuse of discretion." Ballard v. 
Superior Court, 64 Cal.2d at 177, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 313, 410 
P.2d at 849, quoting State v. Klueber, 81 S.D. 223, 229, 132 
N.W.2d 847, 850 (1965). Finally, the purpose of the 
psychiatric examination "is to detect any mental or moral 
delusions or tendencies causing distortion of the imagination 
that would affect the probable credibility of the complaining 
witness." State v. Wounded Head, 305 N.W.2d at 679. 
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This rourt's discussion in State v. Hubbard, utah, 
601 P. 2d 9 2g ( lg7g), of whether it was error for a trial judge 
to refuse to order a psychiatric examination to determine 
competency of a witness indicates that the majority view 
applies in Utah as well: 
We do not question that if it were made to 
appear that there is a substantial doubt 
that a witness is capable of 
and appreciating the duty to tell the 
truth, or that he is able to perceive, 
remember and communicate facts with 
reasonable accuracy, the trial judge might 
grant a request for such an examination 
before permitting him to testify. 
However, in the very nature of such an 
inquiry, and the prerogatives which belong 
in the first instance to the trial judge, 
and secondly to the jury, of judging the 
credibility of witnesses, the 
determination as to whether such an 
examination should be had must necessarily 
rest largely within the discretion of the 
trial judge. 
601 P.2d at 930. see also State v. Wilkerson, Utah, 612 P.2d 
362, 364 (1980), where the Court said: "The trial court has 
substantial discretion in examining the ability of the child 
to perceive and truthfully relate facts." 
It does not appear from the record that appellants 
presented a compelling reason for ordering psychiatric 
examinations of Wanda and Lisa Lairby (see R. 9, 231-233). 
They offered nothing more than that, based upon a 
psychological evaluation they had of Wanda Lairby, they 
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believed a "folie a deux"l might exist between Wanda and 
Lisa. This simply did not rise to the level of a compelling 
reason to order examinations. The evidence referred to by 
appellants is wholly insufficient to conclude that 
examinations were required to determine whether some 
psychological abnormality affected the credibility of those 
witnesses. see State v. Wounded Head, 305 N.W.2d at 677. , 
Appellants' motion was clearly a fishing expedition, which 
should not be countenanced by the trial courts. See State v. 
Gregg, 602 P.2d at 92. 
Based upon the foregoing, the trial court, with no 
compelling reason before it, did not abuse its considerable 
discretion in refusing to order psychiatric examinations of 
Wanda and Lisa Lairby. 
POINT VI 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ADMITTING 
ONLY A PORTION OF A LETTER WRITTEN BY 
APPELLANT TIMOTHY LAIRRY. 
It is generally recognized that when a portion of a 
writing, conversation, or statement is introduced by one 
party, the other party may request introduction of the whole, 
subject to two qualifications: "The portions sought to be 
admitted (1) must be relevant to the issues and (2) only those 
1 A folie a deux is "the presence of the same or similar 
delusional ideas in two associated with one another." 
Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary (1981). 
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parts which qualify or explain the subject matter of the 
portion offered by the nppnnent need be admitted," united 
States v. Walker, 652 F.2d 70R, 710 (7th Cir, 1981), citing 
United States v. 511 F.2d 482, 486-487 (7th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 821i (lg75). See also Rule 106, utah 
Rules of Evidence (lg83). 
At issue here is a letter written by appellant 
Timothy Lairby. It is not clear from the record which party 
offered the letter for introduction into evidence (see R. 92 
which indicates the State did, and R. 768 which indicates 
appellants did). It is clear, however, that the trial court 
received only a portion of the letter, over appellants' 
objection (see R. 768-769). Appellants apparently never 
specified to the trial court why the exclllr1ed portions of the 
letter were relevant and how they served to qualify or explain 
the subject matter of the portion admitted. 
On appeal, appellants fail to show that the two 
qualifications to the general rule expressed in Walker were 
satisfied in this case. Furthermore, the letter (particularly 
the excluded portion) was not included in the record on 
appeal. This Court has repeatedly said that it cannot rule on 
a question when there is an inadequate record upon which to 
resolve it. see State v. Jones, Utah, 657 P.2d 1263, 1267 
(1982); State v. Wulffenstein, Utah, 657 P.2d 289, 293 (1982); 
State v. Mitchell, Utah, 671 P.2d 213 (1983). Therefore, thi.s 
court should not consider appellants' argument concerning 
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admission of only a portion of the letter. 
Finally, even if this Court were to find that the 
trial court erred, the error was harmless. In the context of 
the entire case, it can be safely concluded that exclusion of 
portions of the letter had little effect on the outcome of the 
trial. Certainly, the excluded evidence would not have had a 
substantial influence in bringing about a dif!erent verdict, 
and thus reversal is not in order. Rule 5, Utah Rules of 
Evidence (1971); Rule 103, Utah Rules of Evidence (1983); 
State v. Fontana, Utah, P.2d , No. 17796, slip op. at 
p.9 (decided March 2, 1984). 
POINT VII 
LISA LARIBY'S TESTIMONY WAS NOT SO 
INHERENTLY IMPROBABLE AS TO WARRANT 
UPSETTING THE JURY'S VERDICT. 
Appellants• argument in Point VIII of their brief is 
two-fold. First, the point heading suggests that appellants 
believe the trial judge should not have allowed Lisa Lairby, a 
6-year old child, to testify. However, appellants made no 
objection to her testifying, either in a pretrial motion or 
when she took the stand at trial. This Court will not review 
the admissibility of evidence that was not objected to at 
trial. State v. Bingham, Utah, P.2d , No. 18774, slip 
op. at p.6; State v. Mccardell, Utah, 652 P.2d 942, 947 
(1982). Because "the facts are not such that great and 
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manifest injustice would be done if this court does not 
entertain the issue sua sponte as an exception," State v. 
Pierce, Utah, fi55 P.2d fi7fi, fi77 (1982), the first prong of 
appellants' argument should not he considered. 
Second, appellants argue that Lisa Lairby's 
testimony was so inherently improbable that there must have 
been a reasonable doubt as to their guilt. Tpis argument 
ignores the wide latitude that has traditionally been afforded 
courts in admi.tting the testimony of children. see State v. 
Wilkerson, Utah, 612 P.2d 3fi2, 364 (1980); State v. McMillan, 
Utah, 588 p.2d 162, 163-164 (1978); people v. Ortega, Colo. 
App., 672 P.2d 215, 218 ( 1983). AS a practical matter, a 
reviewing court should be particularly tolerant of a child 
witness's use of terms not normally used by adults when it 
addresses the question of whether the child's testimony is 
inherently improbable--especially in sexual abuse cases. A 
child may perceive and relate facts differently than would an 
adult, but that does not prevent a child from testifying 
truthfully, accurately, and in a manner that can be understood 
by the jury. Nor does it prevent a jury from determining 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the facts testified to by the 
child have in fact occurred. 
Appellants focus on Lisa Lairby's "child-like" 
descriptions of what appellant Timothy Lairby had done to her 
as examples of inherently improbable testimony. However, her 
use of the word "winky" instead of "penis," or the word "puke" 
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instead of "ejaculate," does not render her testimony 
unbelievable and therefore insufficient to support appellants' 
conviction. Those terms might reasonahly he used by a 6-year 
old child to describe what must have been an extremely 
traumatic experience. Additionally, the conflicts between her 
testimony and that of other witnesses were questions for the 
jury to resolve and were not of sufficient to 
warrant upsetting the jury's verdict. See State v. Howell, 
649 P.2d at 97. As noted by this Court in State v. 
Middlestadt, Utah, 579 P.2d 908 (1978): 
In general, the common-law supports the 
contention that a conviction may be 
sustained upon the uncorroborated 
testimony of the victim, and that such 
evidence is not insubstantial simply 
because the testimony is conflicting in 
some respects. As to the quality of the 
testimony given, it is settled that it 
must be so improbable that it is 
completely unbelievable before it is 
insufficient to uphold a conviction. 
579 P.2d at 911. See also State v. McMillan, 588 P.2d at 164. 
POINT VIII 
UNDER THE STANDARDS FOR REVIEW OF AN 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAIM, 
APPELLANTS' CONVICTIONS SHOULD BE 
AFFIRMED. 
The governing legal standards applicable to a claim 
of ineffective assistance of counsel were recently summarized 
by this Court in Codianna v. Morris, Utah, 660 P.2d 1101 
(1983): 
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This Court has previously held in a 
murder case involvinq appointed counsel 
that an accused "is entitled to the 
assistanrP of a rompetent member of the 
Bar, who shows a willingness to identify 
himself with the interests of the accused 
and present such 14efenses as are available 
under the law and consistent with the 
ethics of the profession." State v. 
McNicol, !Jtah, 554 P.2d 203, 204 (197fi). 
Accord, State v. Gray, Utah, 601 P.2d 918 
(1979); Strong v. Turner, 22 Utah 2d 118, 
449 P.2d 241 ( 19fi9). The McNicol has 
a subjective element--"willingness to 
identify himself with the interests of the 
accused"--and an obJective element--" 
competent member of the Bar." The 
objective element is measured both by 
general ability or experience and by 
performance in the defense of a particular 
case. Both elements (willingness to 
identify with the accused, and competence) 
a re es sent i al to adequate represent at ion. 
The McNicol test, which we reaffirm, 
includes all of the requirments the Court 
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 
identified in its recent redefinition of 
the constitutional requirements of 
effective assistance of counsel. 
rejecting the "sham and mockery" test that 
had previously been applied in the Tenth 
and other circuits, the court held: "The 
Sixth Amendment demands that defense 
cousel exercise the skill, judgmenr and 
diligence of a reasonably competent 
defense attorney." Dyer v. Crisp, 613 
F.2d 275, 278 (10th Cir. 1980) (en bane). 
Relying on Dyer v. Crisp, supra, and 
other authorities, our recent oprr;TOn in 
State v. Malmrose, Utah, 649 P.2d 56, 58 
( 1982), identifies the following 
considerations necessary to determine 
whether a conviction should be reversed or 
set aside on the basis of ineffective 
assistance of counsel: (1) The burden of 
establishing inadequate representation is 
on the defendant, "and proof of such must 
be a demonstrable reality and not a 
speculative matter." State v. McNicol, 
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554 P.2d at 204. (2) A lawyer's 
"legitimate exercise of jugdment" in the 
choice of trial strategy or tactics that 
did not produce the anticipated result 
does not constitute ineffective assistance 
of counsel. State v. McNicol, 554 P.2d at 
205. ( 3) It must appear that any 
deficiency in the performance of counsel 
was prejudicial. State v. Forsyth, Utah, 
560 P.2d 337, 339 (1977); Jaramillo v. 
Turner, 24 Utah 2d 19, 22, 465 P.2d 343, 
345 (1970). In this context, prejudice 
means that without counsel's error there 
was a "reasonable likelihood that there 
would have been a different result 
State v. Gray, 601 P.2d at 920. 
S1m1larly, as we noted in State v. 
Malmrose, 649 P.2d at 58, "the failure of 
counsel to make motions or objections 
which would be futile if raised does not 
constitute ineffective assistance. 
660 P.2d at 1109. These standards parallel those set forth by 
the united States Supreme Court in its recent decision of 
Strickland v. Washington, U.S. , 35 CrL 3066 (decided May 
14, 1984). Under the Sixth Amendment a defendant is entitled 
to "reasonably effective assistance" of counsel. However, a 
reviewing court's analysis of an ineffective assistance claim 
is two-tiered. As stated in Strickland: 
A convicted defendant's claim that 
counsel's assistance was so defective as 
to require reversal of a conviction or 
death sentence has two components. First, 
the defendant must show that counsel's 
performance was deficient. This requires 
showing that counsel made errors so 
serious that counsel was not functioning 
as the •counsel" guaranteed the defendant 
by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the 
defendant must show that the deficient 
performance prejudiced the defense. This 
requires showing that counsel's errors 
were so serious as to deprive the 
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defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose 
result is reliab1.,. Unless a defendant 
makes both showings, it cannot be said 
that the conviction or death sentence 
resulted from a breakdown in the adversary 
process tha• renders the result 
u n re 1 i ab le . 
35 CrL at 3071. Significantly, the second component of 
demonstrable prejudice was adopted by this Court in Codianna, 
660 l'.2d at llog. Thus, appellants' argument,that they should 
not have to show prejudice is not only inconsistent with the 
law of this state, but is now also contrary to the latest 
pronouncement on the issue from this country's highest court. 
Several factors stressed in the Strickland opinion 
are particularly important. An attorney's performance should 
be evaluated in terms of reason ab le nes s ide ring al 1 of 
the circumstances.• 35 CrL at 3071. "Judicial scrutiny of 
counsel's performance must be highly deferential." 
307 2. 
A convicted defendant making a claim of 
ineffective assistance must identify the 
acts or omissions of counsel that are 
alleged not to have been the result of 
reasonable professional judgment. The 
court must then determine whether, in 
light of all the circumstances, the 
identified acts or omissions were outside 
the wide range of professionally competent 
assistance. In making that determination, 
the court should keep in mind that 
counsel's function, as elaborated in 
prevailing professional norms, is to make 
the adversarial testing process work in 
the particular case. At the same time, 
the court should recognize that counsel is 
strongly presumed to have rendered 
adequate assistance and make all 




With respect to the defendant's burrlen to show 
prejudice if he or she is able to show that particular errors 
of counsel were unreasonable, the Supreme Court stated: 
Even if a defendant shows that particular 
errors of counsel were unreasonable, 
therefore, the defendant must show that 
they actually had an adverse effect on the 
defense. 
It is not enough for the defendant to 
show that the errors had some conceivable 
effect on the outcome of the proceeding. 
Virtually every act or omission of counsel 
would meet that test, cf. United States v. 
Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 u.s. 858, 866-867 
(1982), and not every error that 
conceivably could have influenced the 
outcome undermines the reliability of the 
result of the proceeding. 
The defendant must show that there is a 
easonable probability that, but for 
counsel's unprofessional errors, the 
result of the proceeding would have been 
different. A reasonable probability is a 
probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome. 
Id. at 3073. 
Appellants specifically identify seven alleged 
errors committed by trial counsel which, they contend, 
establish ineffective assitance of counsel and require 
reversal of their convictions. Each of those alleged errors 
will be discussed separately. 
Appellants cite trial counsel's opening statement to 
the jury as evidence of ineffective assistance. Admittedly, 
the statement was far from eloquent, but it clearly did not 
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prejudice appellants in any significant way. In fact, because 
not much was said to the jury in that statement, it probably 
had little effect one way or the other. A less than brilliant 
opening statement by trial counsel simply did not deny 
appellants the opportunity to present their case to the jury. 
The claim that a reasonably competent defense 
attorney would have moved to strike the of Craig 
Duvall, Christine Swanson, Finia Feuiaki, and Kelly powers is 
completely unsupported by any law or substantive discussion as 
to why that testimony should have been stricken, or whether it 
was even likely the trial court would have granted such a 
request. Without more, appellants claim is highly 
speculative. 
Appellants argue that trial counsel failed 
effectively to impeach a State's witness because counsel did 
not have preliminary hearing transcripts which allegedly 
contained prior inconsistent statements. However, the record 
indicates that counsel had some transcript of a prior 
proceeding in his possission when he cross-examined the 
witness (see R. 501). Furthermore, there is nothing in the 
record to show that the preliminary hearing transcripts, if 
counsel in fact did not have them, contained prior 
inconsistent statements that would have been helpful for 
impeachment purposes. It is well settled that this Court 
cannot rule on matters outside the trial court record. See 
state v. Bingham, Utah, No. 18774, slip op. at p.5 
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(decided June 13, 1984). 
Of some concern is trial counsel's failure to object 
to questions about appellant Mildred Lairby's decision to 
remain silent after being advised of her Miranda rights after 
arrest. Eliciting evidence of a defendant's decision to 
exercise his or her constitutional right to remain silent, or 
prosecutorial comment thereon, may violate a right 
against self-incrimination. see DOyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 
(1976); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965); State v. 
Hales, Utah, 652 P.2d 1290 (1982); State v. Wiswell, Utah, 639 
P.2d 146 (1981). Thus, it was error for appellants' counsel 
not to object to the questions asked by the prosecutor (see R. 
556) and to himself ask questions about the subject (see R. 
557-558). The issue then is whether this error was 
prejudicial to appellants. 
In Wiswell, this Court stressed that it was the 
prosecutor's repeated efforts to elicit testimony about the 
defendant's post-arrest silence and his comment thereon in 
final argument that resulted in prejudice to the defendant. 
See 639 P.2d at 147. However, it was implied in Wiswell and 
expressed more clearly in State v. Hales, 652 P.2d at 1292, 
that evidence of or comments on a defendant's silence does not 
automatically result in prejudicial error. Curative 
instructions, for instance, are an important consideration for 
reviewing courts. See Hales, 652 P.2d at 1292. Also, Wiswell 
implied that if the improper evidence or prosecutorial comment 
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is not extensive, reversible error may not result. see 
Wiswell, 639 P.2d at 147-148, including the dissenting opinion 
of C.J. Hall. 
In the present case, the evidence of Mildred 
Lairby's post-arrest silence was quite limited, There was no 
comment on it in closing argument, Additionally, the trial 
judge, having admonished counsel not to menti9n the subject in 
final argument {see R. 797-798), specifically instructed the 
jury "that no presumption or inference adverse to [Mildred 
Lairby) is to arise from the fact that she exercised her 
constitutional right to speak to an attorney.• See 
Instruction No. 27 (R. 128). Under these circumstances, the 
error of counsel and, quite frankly, the possible error of the 
trial court in not striking the improper evidence on its own 
motion, did not amount to prejudicial error. The situation 
here is clearly distinguishable from that in Wiswell. 
Appellants' further claims concerning failure tc 
object to the admission of a "highly prejudicial document" 
without ever having seen or requested to see the document, 
failure effectively to elicit character evidence, and failure 
to give an effective closing argument can be disposed of 
rather summarily. The record indicates that counsel asked to 
read the letter referred to by appellants and that he 
initially objected to its admission {see R. 730, 734). 
Although counsel experienced some difficulty in questioning 
"character witnesses,• he was able to elicit some reputation 
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evidence that may have been of value to appellants. 
Furthermore, on appeal appellants make now showing that these 
character witnesses had anything substantial to offer. 
Finally, although counsel's closing argument may not be the 
one appellants' present counsel would have given, it fairly 
presented to the jury appellants' case. Appellants fail to 
point to anything in particular to support their conclusion 
that the argument "fell far below the level of quality 
expected fran a reasonably canpetent defense attorney." See 
Appellants' Supplemental Brief at pp. 9-10. 
Appellants bear the burden of establishing 
ineffective assistance of counsel by demonstrable, not 
speculative, proof; and they must show that "any deficiency in 
the performance of counsel was prejudicial." Codianna, 660 
P.2d at 1109. see also Strickland v. Washington, 35 CrL at 
3071. Appellants' proof with respect to counsel's alleged 
errors being unreasonable is largely speculative. With 
respect to the prejudice canponent the lack of merit in 
appellants' claim is even more evident. They do not even 
argue that without counsel's alleged errors "there was a 
'reasonable likelihood that there would have been a different 
result.'. • Codianna, 660 P.2d at 1109. Nor does a review 
of the entire record and the substantial evidence presented 
against appellants suggest a reasonable likelihood of a 
different result without the alleged errors which, if errors 
at all, were not "so serious as to deprive [appellants] of a 
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fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable," Strickland, 35 
CrL at 3071. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the judgments and 
sentences of the trial court should be affirmed, 
RESPECTFULLY sut:rnitte<'I this 15th day of June, 19B4, 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
Assistant Attorney General 
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